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Abstract  
Mobile application developers define the terms of use for the applications they develop, which users 
may accept or declined during installation. Application developers on the one hand seek to gain access 
to as many user information as possible, while users on the other hand seem to lack awareness and 
comprehension of privacy policies. This allows application developers to store an enormous number of 
personal data, sometimes even irrelevant to the application’s function. It’s also common that users 
choose not to alter the default settings, even when such an option is provided. In combination, the above 
conditions jeopardize users’ rights to privacy. In this research, we examined the Viber application to 
demonstrate how effortless it is to discover the identity of unknown Viber users. We chose a 
pseudorandom sample of 2000 cellular telephone numbers and examined if we could reveal their 
personal information. We designed an empirical study that compares the reported behavior with the 
actual behavior of Viber’s users. The results of this study show that users’ anonymity and privacy is 
easily deprived and information is exposed to a knowledgeable seeker. We provide guidelines addressed 
to both mobile application users and developers to increase privacy awareness and prevent privacy 
violations. 
Key words: Viber, privacy, awareness, anonymity, privacy deprivation, public data, mobile apps. 
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The massive increase of smartphone use has created new opportunities in the telecommunications’ field. 
Multiple instant messaging applications like Viber, WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger are being 
downloaded, installed, and used daily to enhance human communication, making these apps an 
important part of almost anyone’s social life. According to the surveys by Statista (Statista, 2017a; 
2017b; 2017c) in 2017’s first quarter, there were 1.2 billion WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger and 
891 million Viber’s unique users. Such mobile applications (hereafter mobile apps) have evolved from 
being a simple instant messaging service to a multi-use social networking tool. Apart from Instant 
Messaging, they provide voice messaging, file and photos sharing, location tracking, voice calls and 
many more features. Mobile app developers (hereafter app developers) are responsible for the mobile 
app’s permission set. This allows app developers to collect a vast amount of information on users, such 
as mobile numbers, locations, contact lists, profile pictures, or other users’ private information and to 
use them at will or opportunity, including selling data to third parties.  
Recent studies have concluded that users consent to the mobile app’s permission set, as a mandatory 
step in the downloading process, without actually reading the privacy policy. The result is the 
misinformed exposure of their personal data. McDonald and Cranor (2009) illustrated that such privacy 
policies are far too long and complicated for the users to spend their time reading them. Giovani and 
Pashley (2007) state that even though users are informed about the possible consequences of a leakage 
of personal data and the imminent dangers involved, they don’t change their security settings in their 
social networks and they keep on using them as usual, although they know how to change them. 
According to Tow et al. (2008), users are not well informed and, therefore, not aware of their personal 
data exposure, or they feel it is unlikely that such a privacy incident could harm them. So, users are 
unaware of the risks they are facing, such as identity forge, stealing, impersonation and many others, as 
they lack the knowledge required to evaluate these risks (Pitkanen & Tuunainen, 2012). 
Our aim is to demonstrate how effortless it is to discover the identity of an unknown app user by only 
processing self-exposed public data and to offer guidelines for mobile app users and developers.  We 
revealed users’ personal information such as their real name, address and other personal data. It is crucial 
to show that even without any prior information we can extract automatically information on one’s 
private habits, such as the time they wake-up or when they switch on and off their mobile phone. More 
importantly, we can do this for a large number of people, and not only for targeted individuals. The 
purpose of such a demonstration is to enhance privacy awareness of mobile app users and to inform 
them about the risks involved in disclosing their public data, so that they would change the privacy 
settings on their mobile apps and stop blindly accepting privacy policies.  
In order to examine our claim that users’ identity can be revealed by publicly available data, we 
conducted an empirical experiment using the popular instant messaging mobile app Viber. We chose a 
set of 2000 pseudo-random cellphone dummy numbers and we automatically discovered which of them 
have the Viber app installed. We had a prior knowledge that these cellphone numbers were active in the 
recent past. The de-anonymization process was successful for 75% of our test sample. In most cases, we 
disclosed the full name of the subject and his/her address. This study is the first, to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, to show that this kind of information can be gathered in a large scale without targeting 
specific subjects. Buchenscheit et al. (2014) have similarly studied WhatsApp mobile app and concluded 
through an experiment that it is possible to infer users’ habits. Although the study of Buchenscheit et al. 
(2014) reveals several privacy related inferences, it does not show that users’ identities can also be 
revealed, which we do in this paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section two we present the related work. Section three presents the 
methodology we followed and the preparation we made in order to accomplish our data mining aims 
and create meaningful statistic data. In section four, we present our de-anonymization results, our 
statistical analysis and our empirical questionnaire results (see Appendix). Section five presents the 
contribution of the paper and a guide for best practices to reduce private data leak. Finally, section six 
concludes the paper. 
Paspatis et al. /De-anonymization using public data 
 
 
The 11th Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems (MCIS), Genoa, Italy, 2017 3 
 
 
2 Related Work 
In order to examine scholar disquisition associated to our research objective, we reviewed the following 
literature areas: (a) general literature on personal data disclosure, (b) users’ privacy awareness, and (c) 
mobile apps’ features and vulnerabilities. At section 2.3, we specifically examined the Androids OS 
security characteristics and features. We chose to study Android OS because it allows users to change 
the security settings (Benenson & Reinfelder, 2013). On the other hand, IOS uses an App review process 
system when a new app is uploaded to its App Store, whilst users cannot change any security settings 
or review the permission set before installation.  
2.1 Personal Data Disclosure  
The invasion and violation of one’s privacy and personality includes unauthorized collection, publishing 
and/or posting of personal data through the Internet and any other use of personal information without 
the prior consent of the data subject (Wang et al., 1998). The collection, sale and/or exchange of personal 
data between companies or individuals has become a common practice (Gillmor, 1998) as the Internet  
has made it easy to collect and store large volumes of personal information (Caruso, 1998). According 
to a 2002 survey (Rust et al., 2002) it has become impossible for consumers to carry out almost any 
electronic transaction without revealing some sort of personal information. Several online companies 
are operating on collecting and using such personal data (Fletcher, 2003). Users show an increased 
concern when their data are collected and disclosed on the web (Global Internet User Survey, 2012; 
TRUSTe, 2014). Several researchers have set out indicators on consumers’ concerns when the handling 
of their personal information is involved (Sheehan and Hoy, 2000; Dinev and Hart, 2004; Bellman et 
al., 2004). Users’ awareness on data collection, misuse of data, experience in internet use, social profile 
and consumers’ level of education are some of these indicators.  
2.2 Users’ privacy awareness and the cost of reading privacy policies 
McDonald and Cranor (2008) examined the reasons why users’ do not read the privacy policies, as well 
as time and financial costs of reading them. They investigated 75 of the most popular websites, and they 
reveal that a user would need about 10 minutes to read one privacy policy, at an average read rate of 
250 words/minute. Also, they concluded that an average user should read at least 1354 privacy policies 
per year, where 412 of them should be read while at work hours (McDonald and Cranor, 2008). Based 
on the above, they conclude that a user would have to spend 40 minutes per day for just reading policies, 
while the average user is browsing the internet for approximately 72 minutes per day. Translating this 
into financial cost would mean about 3500 dollars per year for a user, while at a national level (in the 
U.S., where the research was conducted) this would be 781 billion per year. Capistrano and Chena 
(2015) showed that the specificity of the privacy policy has a significant effect on consumers' 
perceptions of its importance in deciding to share personal information.  The key factor for their decision 
was the length of the privacy policy as primary reason as well as the visibility of its. 
Govani and Pashley (2007) focused on the privacy awareness of university students in relation to the 
Facebook social network. According to their findings the majority of students are aware of the potential 
impact from the leakage of personal data as well as the imminent danger of impersonation or monitoring. 
Although they are aware of their options to limit the leakage of personal data, they dο not take any 
action. This is in line with the findings of Tow et al. (2008) that users are either not fully aware of the 
privacy incidents or feel that the likelihood of privacy violation is too small to happen. Similar results 
have been shown by Gross and Acquisti (2005). Their findings stated that the risk of personal exposure 
or identity theft and other negative effects is proportional to the amount of information a user exposes. 
Almuhimedi et al. (2014) concluded that most users are unaware that their personal data are collected 
by mobile apps and also that their location can be exposed by these data. In addition, they suggested the 
use of an app permission manager such as AppOps, an embedded app manager in Android 4.2. The 
permission manager will notify users with privacy nudges in case an app starts to use a permission that 
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can expose their personal information. Similar privacy nudges are present iOS 6 and after, where users 
receive popup warnings about usage of some data types and are asked for informed consent (Benenson 
and Reinfelder, 2013). As conclusion of the above, is proved that the users’ low awareness can lead to 
privacy risk incidents or increase the chance for them to be happen. Researchers also concluded that 
users avoid reading privacy policies due to their extended length or the time need it for it. 
2.3 Mobile apps’ features and vulnerabilities 
The Mobile Device Safety Management with Android operating system is implemented with a multisite 
security system (Boksasp et al., 2012). This Safety Management System includes: (a) app’s permission 
management system (permission set), (b) sandboxing, (c) unique certification signing for every 
developer, (d) remote kill switch for detected malfunctioning apps, (e) core file system protection in 
read only mode, (f) google bouncer as anti-virus, and (g) third-party antiviruses. These security 
characteristics tend to protect only the device and not user’s data. According to a Pew Research Center 
survey (2012), 82.56% of the app’s that are available for downloading in app markets are requiring the 
permission “Full network access”, while 23.75% of apps are requiring the permission “Precise Location 
GPS and network based Permission”. These permissions are giving the opportunity to an app developer 
to disclose users’ real location. Combined with the fact that most users install at least 10 apps on their 
mobile device (Olmstead & Atkinson, 2015), it creates favorable conditions for revealing users’ 
location. Rakib and Ho (2011) concluded that service providers should consider users’ privacy concerns 
before they use capabilities such as location detection or personal-data detection. Buchenscheit et al. 
(2014) have studied WhatsApp mobile app and found, through an experiment, that it is possible to infer 
users’ habits. Several researchers have shown that many users not pay attention to the permissions are 
granting to an app upon installation (Felt et al., 2012; Kelley et al., 2012).  The researchers also, 
concluded that the technical language in which they are written is not easy to understand. Benenson and 
Reinfelder (2012) showed that Android users would be better informed about possible risks in case they 
notice and can understand the permissions. The same researchers concluded that although the Android’s 
permissions visibility and cryptic language is difficult to understand, they seem to work in raising 
awareness at least with more technically savvy users. Appelman et al. (2011) conducted a research 
regarding Viber’s communication security. Some of their findings were: Viber’s database is unencrypted 
and easy accessible, it is possible to bypass the official registration process and one could forge a 
person’s Viber account, data messages  are probably sending scrambled and not encrypted. 
Users’ low privacy awareness and the difficulties they face on reading privacy policies, as mentioned in 
chapters 2.1 and 2.2, combined with the mobile devices’ security management system, create 
appropriate conditions for the non-consented disclosure of personal information. In our experiment, we 
show that it is possible to disclose users’ personal information, such as real name and surname, profile 
photos and address without any prior knowledge of their identities. This study is the first, to the best of 
the authors’ knowledge, where these vulnerabilities of the security management system are explored 
with actual personal information for empirical investigation.  
3 Preparation and methodology 
Viber’s users are nearly 900 million as of March 2017. This makes Viber a perfect candidate to conduct 
our research. There are three core characteristics of this app that are essential to note. Firstly, when a 
user installs Viber, her cell phone number is sent to Viber’s servers by default. Also, as feature, the 
contact list of the new user’s device is parsed, and every Viber’s user who is registered at this contact 
list is automatically informed about the new user enrolment. Secondly, there is a practical difficulty for 
a user to exit the mobile app. Even if the user presses the exit button from the app’s menu, the app will 
continue running in the background as a service. Lastly, the mobile app allows a massive import of 
contact data in Viber’s contact list without any confirmation from the other users. This feature was 
exploited in our research. 
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3.1 System Preparation 
To create a controlled setting for our experiment, we created a virtual machine with Microsoft Windows 
10 and we installed our toolset. Our toolset is composed by Viber for Desktop, DB Browser for SQLite 
for the mobiles’ database handling, Python for our scripts and Netbeans for Java to create our crawlers. 
The virtual machine is equipped with an Intel i7 6700, 16 GB of RAM and 250 GB SSD SATA 3 disk. 
Also, a sim card was purchased for the testing device to activate the “Viber for Desktop” application. 
3.2 Methodology of data mining 
To start our data mining we first wrote an 8-line python script with which we created a 2000-line dummy 
csv file. The file was grafted as follows: name as dummyName[serial number], surname as 
dummySurname[serial number], cellphone number as +3069xxxxx[serial number]. Then, we created a 
new Gmail account and we imported our dummy csv file as real contacts. Next, we installed Viber for 
cellphones and we added the Gmail account we created. The cellphone numbers were pseudorandom 
numbers. We had prior knowledge that these phone numbers were employees’ phone numbers of a 
telecommunication company that stopped functioning since 2013. In sequence, the Viber app started to 
synchronize our dummy dataset with real Viber accounts. After this step, we can see in our testing device 
which contacts have an account on Viber. This was performed by opening the viber.db with the SQLite 
app and running the SQL query “select * from Contact where ViberContact = 1 and order by Number”. 
The result includes the contacts who have a Viber account (ViberContact = 1), a possible name and a 
possible profile picture (DownloadID not null) (Figure 1). These data were exported to a csv file for 
later processing. 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot from SQLite during datamining 
 
3.3 Methodology of the de-anonymization of the test sample 
With the intention to de-anonymize our data set we used two methods. In the first method, we used three 
public and free databases, Greekphones, Sync.me and TrueCaller. These databases contain freely given 
personal data from various sources, such as public data records or personal data that were disclosed on 
social networks such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter (Loie Favre, 2014). We should notice that 
Sync.me is also using another method to collect data. When Sync.me is installed in a cellphone it uploads 
all phone numbers that are stored in the device’s contact list or in the Gmail account contact list (Heather 
Clancy, 2013). For the database “Greekphones” we created a custom-made crawler based on java and 
the jsoup library. Our crawler automatically parses the Name and Surname, the address, the postal code 
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and, in some cases, the occupation of a given set of Greek phone numbers. The other two databases use 
the captcha authentication system and limit the time of use. For this reason, we conducted a semi-
automatic parse: (a) we connected to these two databases through the Tor network, in order to override 
the limited times of use, (b) we authenticated manually at least one time, and (c) we used a custom-made 
java program to find if a given number that wasn’t identified with our first crawler, exists in the other 
two databases. In case of a query limit lockout, we created a new Tor identity and re-authenticated 
through captcha. For our second method, we used the google reverse image lookup. We created an ftp 
server and uploaded the profile pictures we discovered during our data mining exploration. After, we 
created a java program for data handling and used Google reverse image API as an imported library. 
The program tried to identify a person using the hyperlink profile image provided by our ftp server. If 
there were similar pictures, then a web browser would open a webpage with these similar pictures for 
manual identification. Unfortunately, Google has discontinued officially supporting this API (Google, 
2011) and since November 2016 it prevents the automatic parse of the findings in aim to promote its 
new Google Custom Search API. This API limits the searches to 100 per day and, then, charges each 
search based on the number of results (Google, 2016). If a person used the same profile picture in one 
or more social networks, then we were able to discover the name of that person.  
We distinguish two types of de-anonymization. First, full de-anonymization (or de-anonymization) is 
considered when we disclose at least the name and the surname of an entity simultaneously. Second, 
semi de-anonymization occurs when we disclose the name or the surname or a nickname for an entity. 
Both data mining and the de-anonymization can be viewed in greater detail in figure 2. We separated 
figure 2 in ten steps as follow: 
Step 1: we created a pseudo-random .csv with a simple python script 
Step 2: we uploaded the .csv file to a gmail account 
Step 3: In this step the gmail contacts synchronized with our lab smartphone 
Step 4: we synchronized the smartphone with our lab pc 
Step 5: we mined the data from the sqlite DB using DB browser and simple sql scripts 
Step 6: we prepared our databases for handling 
Step 7a-8a: we uploaded the viber images that we mined from step 5 to an ftp server in order to do our 
reverse image lookup 
Step 7b-8b: we used our java custom parser to get public information (name, surname, address) about 
our dataset’s subjects 
Step 9: we reviewed our results from step 8a and manually we removed the inconvenient data. 
Step10: we merged our results to a datasheet file and we conducted our statistical analysis. 
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Figure 2: Steps of data de-anonymization  
3.4 Methodology of Privacy Awareness Exploration 
Within our research we also investigated the privacy awareness level of Viber users regarding the mobile 
app’s privacy settings. For this reason, we designed an empirical study that compares the reported 
behavior with the actual behavior of Viber users. We followed the approach of convenience sampling 
and invited participants who were accessible to the researchers. All participants were holders of a 
computer science diploma. Our sample included 20 individuals, who are users of the Viber mobile app 
and agreed to participate, being aware of the monitoring processes that we followed.  
In order to monitor actual behavior, we included the 20 users in the dataset for 30 consecutive days. The 
purpose of the survey was to investigate if the Viber’s users are aware regarding the features of Viber, 
such as the possibility of personal data and habits exposure. Also, to explore if they were aware of the 
potential risks of the blind consent to the privacy policies. The purpose of the monitoring was to 
determine if we could expose through Viber some of our subjects’ habits, such as the time they turn 
on/off their device or other habits. The monitoring was taking place three times a day at 8.00am, 4.00pm 
and 10.00pm.  
In order to record reported behavior, we distributed a questionnaire that we designed using Google 
Forms due to its characteristics (e.g., speed of processing the results, security and ease of use). The 
questionnaire was distributed online via e-mail to our sample. The survey was running for 30 days and 
all participants replied to the questionnaire. 
4 Results and Statistical analysis 
4.1 De-anonymization results 
After we recovered the accumulated data, we had appropriate and sufficient data to proceed to statistical 
analysis. From the total of 2000 pseudo-random cellphone numbers it emerged that 682 subscribers have 
installed Viber for mobile (34%). From the 682 entities, the 316 entities (46.3%) have uploaded a profile 
picture. From the entities that have uploaded a profile picture we have de-anonymized or semi de-
anonymized 258 of them (82%) while from the entities that hadn’t upload a profile picture we have de-
anonymize or semi de-anonymize 291 of them (80%). In total, from both categories we have de-
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anonymize or semi de-anonymize 549 entities. To conclude, we have fully de-anonymized 475 entities 
(75%). In table 1 we present our results in greater detail. 
 
Description Sample analysis 
Entities with Viber installed (n=2000) 682 (34%) 
Entities with profile picture (n=682) 316 (46%) 
De-anonymized entities with profile picture (n=316) 258(82%) 
Full de-anonymized entities with profile picture (n=258) 220 (82%) 
Semi de-anonymized entities with profile picture (n=258) 38 (18%) 
De-anonymized entities without profile picture (n=366) 291 (80%) 
De-anonymized entities without profile picture (n=291) 255 (88%) 
Semi de-anonymized entities without profile picture (n=291) 36 (12%) 
De-anonymized entities with or without profile picture (n=549) 475 (87%) 
Semi de-anonymized entities with or without profile picture (n=549) 74 (13%) 
De-anonymized entities in total (n=682) 549 (80%) 
Fail to de-anonymize entities (n=682) 133 (20%) 
Table 1. Results of the sample de-anonymization process 
 
4.2 Empirical questionnaire results 
Our findings from the online questionnaire reveal that Viber users have a low level of privacy awareness 
regarding the possibility of personal data exposure and habits’ inference, as well as the potential risks 
of the blind consent to Viber’s privacy policy. From the perspective of privacy awareness, our findings 
showed that all our subjects - except one - never changed their profile picture (95%). 90% of our subjects 
answered that they didn’t read, or didn’t remember if they read, the privacy policy before installing 
Viber. 85% stated that even if they had read it, they weren’t sure if they would have understood it. 90% 
stated that they didn’t know that the data they publish on Viber is considered as public data. The same 
percentage stated that they didn’t know that Viber, according to its privacy policy, can share users’ 
public data with other cooperating social networks, like Facebook or Twitter. 50% stated that they find 
it at least difficult to change Viber’s privacy settings. 65% of our subjects stated that they didn’t know 
it’s possible to identify someone through reverse image lookup, while 75% answered they didn’t know 
that it was possible for someone to be de-anonymized via her phone number. 60% stated that they didn’t 
know that through Viber they could be a target of spam messages or phishing attacks nor that they could 
be a target of physical or electronic monitoring. Nevertheless, 35% would suggest to a friend to install 
Viber, while 60% will continue to use it. 
4.3 Daily Monitoring Results  
From our daily monitoring of the 20 subjects, the following findings were obtained: The 74.9% of our 
participants had been connected to Viber at 8.00 am (+/- 2 hours) at all days. The percentage increased 
during working days at 82.9% (+/- 2 hours). From this, we conclude that most our subjects preferred to 
connect to Viber from their work space. At 4.00 pm and 10.00 pm the percentage of connected subjects 
was approximately at 87% the most of the days. From a privacy perspective, we can conclude that our 
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subjects are more vulnerable to spam messages or unwanted advertising phone calls within this time. 
Our findings are analyzed in greater detail in the following figures (3, 4). Also, we monitored their 
profile pictures changes. Only one of the subjects changed his/her profile picture (5%). From the side of 
privacy this is positive. If the de-anonymization process fails to identify a person through reverse image 
lookup in first place, it is less probable that (s)he will be identified with this process in the future.  
 
Daily Monitoring Results 
 
Figure 3: Daily monitoring results 
 
Figure 4: Working days monitoring results 
From our findings, we conclude that computer science knowledge is not sufficient to enhance individual 
privacy awareness. Most our subjects didn’t read Viber’s privacy policy. Even if they had read it they 
fear that they wouldn’t understand it. The fact that almost all our subjects did not know that the data 
they share with Viber is considered to be public data demonstrates a basic lack of privacy awareness 
with regard to personal data. Finally, since they do not change their privacy settings, they can be an easy 
target for many potential threats, such as spam messaging or monitoring. 
5 Contribution and guidelines 
5.1 Contribution to the Research community 
The importance of users’ awareness has been pointed out by the literature review in section 2 and by 
our experimental and survey results. We proved that even without any prior information about the 
records of our pseudo-random dataset, we could de-anonymize 75% of our subjects, revealing their 
names, surnames and/or home addresses. It is important to consider that interested companies (e.g., 
advertisers or public data handlers) perform such de-anonymization and the derived information is a 
useful tool for their practices. When it comes to the user’s privacy, it appears to be difficult for the 
average user to keep their personal data from becoming public due to lack of awareness. Therefore, this 
exposes them to various types of threats, such as physical and electronic monitoring, hacking or spam 
messaging. The above threats can be abridged by increasing user’s privacy awareness, in conjunction 
with the development of appropriate mobile programming protocols for the developers. 
5.2 Guidelines for the Privacy Regulation Authorities regarding mobile app 
developers 
Our research has demonstrated the ease of acquiring personal data using mobile app characteristics. Our 
experiment would not have been possible if some personal data processing principles had been followed 
by the mobile app. We suggest that the personal data proception authorities consider our findings and 
enforce a set of principles for mobile developing companies and mobile app developers, in order to 














1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
22-working days monitoring
8.00 16.00 22.00
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 Any mobile application should request the users’ consent whenever someone tries to add them to 
their contact list. Even if some mobile apps use implicit consent, we argue that explicit consent is 
imperative for the provision of this right by a user. Therefore, the default setting for a given user 
should be to disable the automatic connection with others, and it be at the discretion of users to 
enable the feature. 
 When the mobile app settings allow the user to expose personal data, such as profile pictures or 
names, the default settings should disable the exposure and it should be at the users’ discretion to 
activate it. 
 When the mobile app collects information that may allow the exposure of personal habits (e.g., state 
the device, turned on or off) the default settings should disable the collection of such data and be 
activated only after users’ explicit consent. The users should be warned about the potential risks 
they may face.  
5.3 Guidelines for mobile app users 
From our experiment results it is shown that it is possible to expose users’ personal data or habits 
regarding the features of a mobile app.  Our experiment wouldn’t have succeed if an informed user had 
disabled some of these characteristics. Below we provide guidelines that will help users to protect their 
data. 
To mobile app users we recommend: 
 Always read the privacy policy before accepting it. It may contain valuable information about your 
personal data handling.   
 Read the mobile app permissions that are granted during the installation. Disable the permissions 
you consider as dangerous even if this limits the mobile app’s functionality (this feature is available 
only from Android version 7 and on). 
 Check the mobile app’s privacy settings before you use it or add your personal information. They 
may contain features that may expose your personal data, such as usual or temporary location, name, 
etc. 
 We recommend to never upload a real profile picture. It can be used to de-anonymize you or to link 
your entity to the social networks you may use.  
 If there is a setting that prevents someone to add you to a social network without your consent, 
consider to enable it. Since many personal data crawlers use auto-join features to profile you, your 
authorization to such an act, can be proved useful to keep your information private.  
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proved that it is possible to de-anonymize Viber users without any prior 
knowledge about their identity. We selected a pseudorandom sample of phone numbers and successfully 
de-anonymized 75% of 682 Viber users by acquiring and disclosing their real name, surname and 
address. Our experiment was successful due to some low security characteristics of Viber, that have 
been reported also by Appelman et al. (2011). We have applied software tools for the data mining 
process, using only freeware tools and software we developed ourselves and de-anonymize our dataset 
with custom made crawlers in conjunction with three, free to use, online phone databases. From the 
above, we conclude how important is to raise users’ awareness for privacy implications in Viber and 
other mobile apps in order to protect their personal data. 
We investigated the privacy awareness level of Viber users regarding the general features of Viber app 
that could expose their personal data, as well as the importance of reading the privacy policies. Our 
exploratory survey included 20 Viber users as participants, all of them holding a computer science 
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diploma. The results verified our initial conjecture about the low level of privacy awareness regarding 
the general features of Viber that could expose their personal data and put themselves in potential risk. 
Indeed, most of the participants were not aware that they could be identified with the use of online 
databases, that their personal habits could be monitored or that their private data is considered as public 
data after they disclose them, voluntarily on mobile applications. Despite the high level of computer 
science education of the participants, they weren’t tempted to read Viber’s privacy policy or alter Viber’s 
privacy settings. Our results emphasize the need to raise privacy awareness of Viber users and of mobile 
applications, in general.  
Based on our findings, we provided general guidelines for the personal data regulation authorities and 
more specific recommendations for the profession of mobile apps developers, all of which aim to protect 
the personal data of mobile apps users by default. We also offered specific guidelines to mobile apps 
users with the main intention to help them protect their personal data, especially since misuse of their 
data could put them at risk. 
 




2. What is your age? 
17 or younger\18-20\21-29\30-39\40-49\50-59\60+ 
3. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received? 
Less than high school degree\High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)\Some college but no 
degree\Associate degree\Bachelor degree\Masters degree\P.H.D. Graduate degree 
4. Do you have an account on a social networking website (like Facebook or Twitter)? 
Yes\No\Maybe 
5. About how many contacts do you currently have on social networking websites? 
0-100\100-500\500+\I have no social network profile 
6. About how many of your "friends" on social networking websites have you met in person? 
All of them\Most of them\About half of them\A few of them\None of them 
7. How often do you change your profile picture on social networking websites? 
Extremely often\Very often\Moderately often\Slightly often\Not at all often 
8. How easy do you think it is to modify your settings on your social networking websites? 
Extremely easy\Very easy\Moderately easy\Slightly easy\Not at all easy 
9. If you could use only one of the following social networking services, which would you use? 
Facebook\Google+\MySpace\Viber\Twitter\Whats App 
10. When you're on social networking websites, about how much of your time do you spend looking at 
what other people have posted? 
All of it\Most of it\About half of it\Some of it\None of it 
11. When you're on social networking websites, about how much of your time do you spend posting 
things about yourself? 
All of it\Most of it\About half of it\Some of it\None of it 
B. What about Viber (Awareness) 
1. Had you read the Privacy Policy Before you installed Viber? 
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Yes\No\Maybe/I can’t remember\I don’t want to answer 
2. If you read the Privacy Policy did you understand it? 
Probably No\Yes\No\I’m not sure\I don’t want to answer 
3. Do you know that by installing viber your viber data are now considered as public data? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
4. Do you know that according to Viber's Privacy Policy Viber can share your data with third parties 
e.g. social networks like Facebook and Twitter? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
5. Do you know that Viber can collect data due to the agreement with other social networks like Face-
book and Twitter? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
6. Do you know that someone could find your profile picture and other personal data like your full name 
or/and your profession/occupation? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
7. Do you know that strangers, employers or friends can follow your habits through Viber e.g. what time 
you switched on your mobile device or check your connection status? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
8. Do you know that through Viber you can be a target of spam messages? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
9. Do you know that through Viber you can be a target of electronic phishing? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
10. Do you know that by using linked data from multiple social networks such as Viber, Twitter, Face-
book you may become electronic and physical monitoring target? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
11. After the above will you recommend Viber to a friend? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
12. Will you continue using Viber? 
Yes\No\I don’t know\I don’t want to answer 
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